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N THE SUPREME COURT 
DF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S T A T E O F U T A H , 
Plaintiff-B espondent, 
vs. ( Case No. 
J O H N F R A N K PACE, and ' 1 3 6 ° 6 
M I L T O N E. H A N S E N , 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Milton E. Hansen 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E 
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
The defendant Milton E. Hansen appeals his con-
dction for crimes of burglary in the second degree and 
jrand larceny. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
Defendants were convicted by a jury of the crimes 
)f burglary in the second degree and grand larceny 
1 
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in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Joseph 
G. Jeppson, Judge, Presiding. The defendant was 
sentenced to serve the indeterminate term as provided 
by law for the crime of burglary in the second degree. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
The defendant urges the reversal of the convictions 
on both counts and that the case be remanded to the 
District Court with directions to dismiss the grand 
larceny count and for a new trial on the burglary 
charge. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On or about March 14, 1973 in the early hours of 
the morning a burglar alarm at the Intermountain 
Farmers' Association premises at 1800 South West 
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah went off causing one 
Thomas Miller to telephone the police, the latter arriv-
ing on the scene at approximately 2:16 a.m. (T. 23, 
24, 25). The premises consist of a yard area encircled 
by a large chain link fence with angle iron and barbed 
wire top strands, an office building, and a combination 
store and warehouse building. (T. 9, 10, 15, 16, 40, 
64, 150). At the time the police arrived, the glass in 
the office door was broken. (T. 39). The defendants 
were never seen inside of the building, (T. 64) but were 
arrested within the fenced boundaries of the property 
and near the southwest corner of the yard. (T. 42, 43). 
2 
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ter the arrest of the defendants, there was found in 
i office building a safe on which an unsuccessful at-
apt to "peel" had been made and one or two foot-
nts left by damp shoes. (T. 46, 47). 
Police officers inspected the store and warehouse 
rt of the premises where they saw some more damp 
rtprints and puddles. (T. 48, 49). I t had been snow-
j from approximately 12:00 a.m. to 2:00 a.m. on 
arch 14,1973. (T. 37). 
There were also several sets of tracks in the snow 
tside of the building, two sets of which led away 
>m the building, over the fence, and left the area on 
learby railroad track. (T. 50, 67, 70). There was a 
sken window on the north side of the warehouse, (T. 
), from which window a set of tracks exited. (T. 44). 
A large double door on the south side of the build-
y was also open at the time. (T. 57). This door was 
type which had dead bolts on one side of the door 
lich went into the ceiling and floor, the other door 
^king with a latch and key into the bolted door. (T. 
, 2 1 ) . Entry into the warehouse and store building 
is made by kicking the south side double doors from 
e outside. (T. 98, 99). 
There were some saddles in the store on March 13, 
>74 with a value of approximately $200.00 each. (T. 
12, 123, 133). The record is not clear as to whether 
not the saddles were there on the following day. (T. 
57, 129). But the defendants did not have them in 
eir possession when they were arrested. (T. 60). 
3 
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The defendants had entered the fenced area fol-
lowing some footprints, in search of persons whom the 
defendant Hansen believed had collided with his car 
sometime earlier, (T. 192, 193) walked around the 
building, (T. 192), noticed that the window had been 
broken and that the warehouse door was open, (T. 192), 
picked up some items that were in a pile near the open 
door, (T. 176, 199) and were arrested by police, (T. 
179). The defendants did not enter the building or take 
any property. (T. 179). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E COURT A B U S E D I T S D I S C R E T I O N 
I N F A I L I N G TO G R A N T T H E D E F E N D A N T 
H A N S E N ' S MOTION F O R A S E V E R A N C E 
P R I O R TO T H E T R I A L . 
On the day of trial and after the jury had been 
impaneled, the defendant Hansen moved for a sever-
ence asserting that he would be prejudiced if tried 
jointly with the defendant Pace. (T. 3, 4). The ques-
tion of whether or not a severance will be granted is 
within the discretion of the trial court. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-31-6 (1953), This court has not heretofore deline-
ated all of the reasons for which a severance can be 
granted under the referenced statute, but the State of 
California has a similar provision, Cal. Penal Code 
§
 1098 (West 1970), and that court has set out the 
grounds for a severance under such a statute. People 
4 
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. Massie, 66 Cal.2d 899, 428 P.2d 869 (1967). The 
California Court in discussing this statute found that 
mong other reasons, when the defendants have con-
licting defenses or there exists the possibility that the 
o-defendant would give exonerating testimony, a sev-
rance should be granted. 
During the trial the defendant Pace did not testify 
nd offered no evidence of any kind in his behalf. In 
nstructing the jury, the court told them not to con-
ider Pace's silence nor to draw any inferences against 
dm from it. (R. 267). The court made no comment 
is to whether the silence of Pace could be considered in 
weighing the testimony of the defendant Hansen. There 
exists a good possibility that the jury inferred Hansen's 
estimony to be suspect because Pace, although present 
it the trial, did not confirm it. If the jury so considered 
Pace's silence against Hansen, he was prejudiced there-
>y. Thus, the defendant Hansen was not only pre-
sented from obtaining possibly exonerating testimony 
Torn Pace because Pace was tried jointly with him 
md could not be called to confirm Hansen's testimony, 
)ut he was burdened with the possibly inculpating sil-
ence of Pace. 
The defendant Hansen offered a defense while the 
lefendant Pace made no defense at all. A situation 
tvhere there was a greater inconsistency in the defenses 
?ould hardly be imagined short of that where each 
accuses the other of the crime. In refusing to grant 
Hansen's motion to sever, the court forced him to trial 
jointly with a defendant whose defense was inconstent 
5 
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with his own and whose silence likely was used against 
him. Further, the court made no attempt to prevent 
the jury from drawing improper inferences from the 
predicament of Hansen in being tried jointly with Pace. 
I t cannot be said that Hansen was not prejudiced by 
the court's refusal to exercise its discretion in this re-
gard. Therefore, the convictions should be reversed. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E COURT E R R E D I N A L L O W I N G 
T H E J U R Y TO H E A R A N D C O N S I D E R 
T E S T I M O N Y W H I C H W A S I N A D M I S S I B L E 
B E C A U S E I T W A S , 
A. E V I D E N C E O F A N O T H E R CRIME. 
B. E V I D E N C E O F I N S T R U M E N T S , T H E 
P O S S E S S I O N OF W H I C H W A S I N F L A M M A -
T O R Y B U T W H I C H I N S T R U M E N T S W E R E 
NOT C O N N E C T E D TO T H E C R I M E S 
C H A R G E D . 
At the trial, one officer Williams was called by the 
State and gave testimony over defense counsel's ob-
jection that he had searched the defendant Hansen in 
the jail subsequent to his arrest and found among 
clothing items a glass cutter and a lock pick. (T. 110, 
111). The court asked the officer to spell "lock pick" 
and that was done. (T. 111). The officer went on to 
describe the lock pick and then related how such an 
item can be used to open a door for which one did not 
have the key. (T. I l l , 112). The defendant asserts 
6 
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at the admission of this testimony was reversible error 
lich this court should notice despite counsel's failure 
give the right reasons for his objections thereto at 
e trial. State v. Poe, 21 Utah2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 
968). Clearly the testimony was offered to show 
at the defendant Hansen was in possession of burg-
r's tools which is a crime in this State, Utah Code 
nn. § 76-5-205 (1953). Therefore, the offering of this 
stimony was evidence of another distinct separate 
ime than the one charged. The law is clear that evid-
Lce of crimes other than the one charged is inadmiss-
le. State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149, 277 P . 972 (1929); 
tate v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 P . 1071 (1915). 
; is apparent from the testimony offered and the 
ngthy explanation of the use of a lock pick that the 
tate offered this evidence primarily for the purpose 
?
 creating in the minds of the jurors the impression 
tat the defendant had a propensity to commit crime 
id thus committed this one because he carried burglary 
>ols. The offering of such testimony for that purpose 
as been unequivocally condemned by decisions of this 
)urt. State v. Johnson, 25 Utah2d 160, 478 P.2d 491 
1970) ; State v. Dickson, 12 Utah2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 
1961) ; State v. Anselmo, supra. In both the Johnson 
ad Dickson cases the court held evidence of other 
rimes was not admissible to disgrace the defendant as 
person of evil character with the propensity to com-
lit crime. In Anselmo, this court noted that only the 
rime charged can be shown, any other which the de-
endant may have contemplated or committed being ir-
elevant. The court further said, 
7 
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"If other actual offenses may not be shown, then 
it must follow that facts and circumstances from 
which some might deduce an inference that those 
who have offended might possibly be induced to 
commit more offenses can likewise not be shown." 
46 Utah at 163. 
Because this evidence had no relevancy to the crime 
charged, the admission thereof is improper. Further, it 
could only have had a prejudicial effect since it accuses 
the defendant of another crime and because of the in-
flammatory and unsavory nature of the instruments. 
Therefore, the reversal of the convictions is warranted. 
B. T H E E V I D E N C E W A S I N A D M I S S -
I B L E B E C A U S E T H E P O S S E S S I O N O F 
T H E I N S T R U M E N T S IS I N F L A M M A T O R Y , 
T H E R E B E I N G N O T H I N G TO CONNECT 
T H E M W I T H T H E C R I M E C H A R G E D . 
There was offered no evidence to show that the 
burglary was effected by the use of a lock pick or a 
glass cutter. On the contrary, all of the evidence tended 
to show the entry to have been made by breaking out 
a window, (T. 39), and by kicking down doors, (T. 
98, 99). There was no physical evidence of the use 
of either of the two tools about which the objectionable 
testimony was solicited. As a result, the testimony be-
comes totally irrelevant and inadmissible under well 
settled rules. To be admissible, evidence must be used 
in the furtherance of the crime. State v. Little, 87 
Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d 756 (1960) (Blackjack and bicycle 
chain inadmissible in prosecution for sale of narcotic); 
8 
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'eople v .Flanagan, 65 Cal.App.2d 371, 150 P.2d 927 
1944); People v. Howard, 10 Cal.App.2d 258, 52 
\2d283 (1935). 
The Supreme Court of Montana has treated this 
>oint in the case markedly similar to this one. State v. 
HlaccUone, 136 Mont. 238, 347 P.2d 1000 (1960). In 
hat case, the defendant was caught at the scene of an 
ttempted burglary and there was offered in evidence 
igainst him a crow bar, two screw drivers, a sledge ham-
ner, and some canvas sacks. Although entry had not 
>een made to the building, a police officer was allowed 
o testify as to how he learned in police school that such 
;ools can be used to rip and peel a safe. The Montana 
Hourt reversed the conviction holding the admission of 
;he tools and all evidence about their use to be error 
vhere there was no showing that any safe was ripped 
)r peeled or that the defendants ever got near a safe. 
The situation is the same in the case before this court: 
There simply was no use ever made of a glass cutter 
JY a lock pick or any evidence tending to indicate the 
use thereof. 
That the evidence must be related to the commis-
sion of the offense is implicit in the Utah court's deci-
sion in State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 206 P . 717 
(1922). In Crawford, where it was alleged that a rob-
bery was committed with a use of a .45 caliber revolver, 
this court found that the trial court erred in admitting 
into evidence .32 and .38 caliber cartridges found in the 
defendant's room. 
But this testimony was offered not because it was 
9 
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relevant but because it was inflammatory. Admittedly, 
were it connected with the crime, the defendant would 
have to live with all of its implications and re judicial 
inferences—but such is not the case. The State served 
up this testimony about a lock pick for the sole purpose 
of disparaging the defendant, of making him appear to 
be of evil disposition with a predisposition for the crime 
of burglary. There is no other explanation for the 
offering of the subject testimony. A similar attempt 
to degrade a defendant required a reversal in State v. 
Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 P . 1071 (1915). In that 
case the defendant was charged with shooting a police 
officer in an attempt to escape arrest. Sometime after 
the shooting a search of the defendant's room turned up 
a revolver which the defendant claimed was his father's, 
a blackjack, two masks, and a pair of sneakers. This 
court observed that the trial court's admission of that 
evidence was error because, 
"The only effect that the admission of those 
articles in evidence before the jury could have 
had was to convince them that the appellant must 
be a bad man, or he would not have had 
them " 46 Utah at 160. 
And such is the only effect that the admission of 
testimony about a lock pick could have in the instant 
case — magnified by the further error of letting the 
police officer describe how such an instrument was used 
when one did not have a key and amplified by the 
court's asking the witness to "spell it." (T. 111). 
The trial court erred in admitting this testimony 
because there was nothing to connect it to the crime— 
10 
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peculiar error in the light of the court's ruling with 
espect to Exhibit 17 offered by the State. Exhibit 17 
j&s a hunting knife found on another defendant. The 
itate urged that the knife be admitted arguing that it 
ould be used as a tool. (T. 164). To that argument, 
he court replied, "could be, but there is no evidence of 
tse, is there?" (T. 164), and denied that exhibit. The 
ailure to reject the testimony about the lock pick and 
he glass cutter for which there was likewise no evidence 
)f use is a reversible error. In the event that there 
:xists doubt as to whether this error was prejudicial— 
m unlikely event considering the testimony—this doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. 
Lewis, 8 Utah2d 224, 332 P.2d 664 (1958). Thus the 
convictions should be reversed. 
P O I N T I I I 
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT DE-
FENDANT HANSEN'S MOTION TO DIS-
MISS THE GRAND LARCENY COUNT AT 
THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE WAS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR AS TO BOTH THE 
BURGLARY AND THE GRAND LARCENY 
COUNTS BECAUSE: 
A. THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVI-
DENCE TO ALLOW THE GRAND LARCENY 
COUNT TO GO TO THE JURY. 
B. THE SUBMISSION OF THE GRAND 
LARCENY COUNT ALLOWED THE JURY 
11 
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TO D R A W A N I N F E R E N C E ON A N I N F E R -
E N C E W H I C H IS I M P R O P E R AS A M A T T E R 
O F L A W . 
Counsel for the defendant Hansen moved to dis-
miss the grand larceny charge at the close of the State's 
case which motion was denied by the court. (T. 168). 
The basis for the motion was that there was not suf-
ficient evidence of a grand larceny to warrant the jury's 
consideration of that charge. I t will be noted from the 
transcript that at no time did the witness Lewis testify 
that saddles were missing although he did state that 
saddles were present on March 13, 1973. (T. 122). 
Some confusion exists as to the number of saddles 
which were present on the premises on March 13, 1973. 
(T. 123). On pages 122 through 140 of the transcript, 
considerable discussion took place about saddles and 
their value. At one point, the prosecutor asked, 
6
'Well, with regard to those three saddles which 
you said were missing, do you have the prices re-
flected in that book?" (T. 127) (emphasis 
added) 
The fact is that the witness Lewis did not then or 
at any time testify that three saddles or any saddles 
were missing. Nor did any other witness testify that 
saddles were missing. I t is at once apparent from the 
transcript that the prosecutor assumed that fact. In 
addition, the court erroneously assumed saddles were 
missing during the trial, (T. 129), and later greatly 
compounded its initial error by instructing the jury that 
saddles were missing. (T. 219). At one point, the 
12 
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fitness Lewis testified that there was a knife lying on 
bag of feed next to the saddles on the 14th day of 
/larch, 1973. (T . 124). I n later testimony (T . 154, 
.55) Mr. Lewis opines that saddles "left the area" 
T. 156). However, from all of this testimony it is 
Lot possible to determine whether or not saddles were 
tolen or even how many saddles were under discus-
ion. 
A further weakness in the grand larceny evidence 
,ppears in the quality of that evidence as to the value 
>f saddles. The defendant submits that there was no 
adequate foundation for the value testimony; that the 
witness Lewis was not competent to testify to the value 
>f the same and there was absolutely no other compe-
ent evidence as to their value. 
The defendants were not found in possession of 
n y saddles nor were any saddles ever marked for 
dentification or offered in evidence. (T . 157 to 164). 
further, it was shown that there were no marks where 
addles were thrown over the fence, (T . 155), nor 
my marks in the snow where saddles or their stirrups 
rould reasonably have left the same had they been 
aken. (T . 144, 145). 
When in a situation such as this, the defendants 
lo not have the opportunity to call their own value wit-
lesses who could offer testimony as to the value of the 
addles—they could not because there was no evidence 
;o be appraised—it is especially prejudicial to the de-
fendants to let an unqualified witness testify as to the 
13 
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value of saddles. The prejudice is even greater be-
cause this error is added on to the unfortunate assump-
tion on the part of the court and the prosecutor that 
the saddles were in fact taken. 
Because of these weaknesses in the quality and 
quantity of the evidence, the court was clearly in error 
in allowing the grand larceny count to go to the jury. 
Apparently the court felt so also in retrospect because 
it vacated the grand larceny conviction after it imposed 
the sentence on the burglary. (R. 254). Accordingly, 
the grand larcency charge should not only be vacated 
but reversed with directions to dismiss it. 
B. THE SUBMISSION OF THE GRAND 
LARCENY COUNT ALLOWED THE JURY 
TO DRAW AN INFERENCE ON AN INFER-
ENCE WHICH IS IMPROPER AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. .*^|' 
Although there exists certain other evidence from 
which the jury could infer that the defendants had 
entered the building and that they did so with the intent 
to commit larceny, it is apparent that they could also 
have arrived at a guilty verdict with respect to the 
burglary charge by relying on the evidence—such as it 
was—of the grand larceny, as reinforced by the court's 
improper comment with respect thereto. (T. 219). 
Whether or not the other evidence would convince the 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be determined. 
I t likewise cannot be determined from this transcript 
and record whether the decision of the jury rested 
14 
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itolly or partially on the improperly submitted grand 
irceny charge. Admittedly, if the jury concluded as 
ley did without considering the evidence of the grand 
irceny, the verdict is proper. If they considered the 
irceny evidence, the verdict is improper. The only way 
o ensure that the jury did not go astray was to submit 
nly the burglary charge. The premise that the burg-
ary charge must stand or fall on the basis of competent 
vidence needs no citation. 
The conclusion that the defendants took the saddles 
5 not a known, observed, or undisputed fact. I t is 
he product of an inference. Nor is the conclusion that 
he defendants were in or entered the building based 
>n known facts, but it may have been drawn from the 
nference that the defendants took the saddles. That 
he latter more likely occurred is supported in the 
Record, it appearing that the jury had deliberated for 
learly two hours on both charges and then found both 
charges against the defendants in only twenty-seven 
ninutes after being wrongly told that the saddles were 
nissing. I t is this specious inference on an inference 
;ort of reasoning that is improper in law, it being "a 
?amiliar rule that one presumption or inference cannot 
'est upon another mere inference or presumption . . . 
[But] . . . can only rest on proven facts." State v. Po-
tello, 40 Utah 56, 68, 119 P . 1023, 1028 (1911) (em-
phasis added). In the Potello case, the defendant was 
found in possession of a horse claimed as the property 
of another. There was at the time in effect in this State, 
as there is now, a "recent possession" statute. Comp. 
Law 1907 §4355; Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402 (1953). 
15 
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The State proved that the horse was missing but not 
that it was the subject of the larceny, there being no 
evidence that it was stolen but merely that it had strayed 
to the range. The court stated, 
"the State seeks to draw the inference that the 
horse strayed to the range some six or eight miles 
from the defendant's place, and that someone 
there took and drove him away; and, since the 
horse was found in the defendant's possession, 
the further inference is sought that the defendant 
took and drove . . . the horse from the range. 
But this is merely resting an inference or a pre-
sumption upon an inference or a presumption." 
40 Utah at 69. 
The court reversed the conviction of Potello holding 
that where the State fails to prove the larceny and 
shows only an inference thereof, it cannot then rely on 
a statute to further infer that the party in possession 
committed the larceny. 
Clearly, the Potello decision prohibits that which 
the jury may well have done in the instant case: Drawn 
an inference from another inference not from proven 
facts. Admitting for purposes of argument only that 
the theft of the saddles was proven, the conclusion an-
nounced by the jury that the defendants committed 
that theft is an inference. Reason and the record tend 
to indicate that the jury then inferred that the defend-
ants had entered the building relying on the inference 
that the defendants stole the saddles for that conclu-
sion. Because the possibility exists that this may have 
occurred, the burglary conviction should be reversed 
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ad remanded for a new trial and the grand larceny 
barge reversed with instructions to dismiss it. 
P O I N T IV 
MISCONDUCT OF T H E JURY DEPRIV-
ED T H E DEFENDANT OF H I S RIGHT TO 
:RIAL BY JURY, TO CONFRONT WIT-
JESSES AGAINST HIM, AND TO CROSS-
SXAMINE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM. 
After the jury had retired to deliberate, two wit-
Lesses were called on behalf of the defense for the pur-
>ose of showing that certain of the jurors had failed to 
emain awake and perceptive during the course of the 
rial. (T. 206). Counsel for the defendant Hansen had 
noved for a mistrial on the day prior when the sleeping 
lad first been called to his attention. (T. 96). The 
»ourt noted at the time that "juror No. 7, Yvonne 
5undel was sleeping." (T. 96), but did not observe 
;hat she missed anything, so therefore, denied the mo-
ion. (T. 96). One of the witnesses called after the 
jury had retired, noticed only one juror exhibiting signs 
}f sleeping, while the other noticed two jurors doing 
50. (T. 210, 211, 212). The witnesses observed jurors 
rub their eyes, close their eyes, let their heads droop 
iown and then jerk them to an upright position again, 
and otherwise comport themselves as dozing or being 
near sleep. (T. 209, 211, 212, 213). This conduct went 
on in the case of juror No. 7 for an hour to an hour 
and one-half, (T. 209), and with respect to the other 
juror for an hour or two. (T. 213). After this evidence 
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was presented, counsel for the defendant Hansen again 
moved for a mistrial which motion was denied (T. 217). 
Under the Constitution of Utah, certain funda-
mental precepts are established and guaranteed to de-
fendants in a criminal prosecution. Among these are 
a right to a jury trial, a right to confront witnesses, 
and a right to cross-examine them. Utah Const, art. I, 
§12. What the Constitution commands is that these 
rights be provided absolutely before the basic right to 
a fair and impartial trial has been satisfied. If a de-
fendant is restricted in the exercise of any of these 
rights, he cannot have had that fundamental fairness 
which is an inextricable part of the American process. 
Inherent in the right to a jury trial is the premise that 
the jury will listen to the evidence. Obviously, if they 
are asleep, or so near sleep that their sensory processes 
are not functioning, they cannot do so. If the jury 
does not hear the evidence, the rights of the defendant 
to cross-examine, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, and to have a jury determine the evidence 
are not afforded him. 
When courts discuss the question of jurors sleep-
ing, it is lumped into the category of juror misconduct, 
the remedy for which is a new trial. However, most of 
the cases on this point find that there was no prejudice 
to the defendant or in fact no misconduct. See State 
V. Jones, 187 Kan. 496, 357 P.2d 760 (1960); Hall v. 
State, 223 Md. 158, 162 A.2d 751 (1960); State v. 
Mellor, 73 Utah 104, 272 P . 635 (1928). 
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The Utah standards with respect to misconduct 
*e set out in State v. Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 64 P . 356 
L901). In Morgan the court said, 
"misconduct by one or more of the jury which 
might have been prejudicial to the accused, raises 
the presumption, especially in a capital case, that 
the accused has been prejudiced thereby and viti-
ates the verdict unless the prosecution shows be-
yond reasonable doubt that the prisoner has re-
ceived no injury by reason thereof." 23 Utah at 
226. 
In the instant case, it cannot be argued that the 
ozing of at least two jurors was not misconduct so as 
o raise the requirement that the prosecution show the 
bsence of prejudice to the defendant. The record re-
eals that the prosecution showed nothing with respect 
o this question, nor did the trial court's conclusions 
orrect the defect. The court should have inquired of 
he jurors whether or not they missed any of the testi-
aony. This the court did not do and as a result the 
resumption that the defendant was prejudiced remains 
o require a reversal of the conviction. 
P O I N T V 
T H E COURT E R R E D I N F U R T H E R IN-
STRUCTING T H E J U R Y W I T H R E S P E C T 
TO T H E L A W O F C I R C U M S T A N T I A L E V I D -
ENCE A F T E R T H E I R D E L I B E R A T I O N S 
HAD B E G U N B E C A U S E : 
A. T H E I N S T R U C T I O N W A S NOT I N 
W R I T I N G 
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B. T H E I N S T R U C T I O N W A S A N INCOR-
R E C T S T A T E M E N T O F T H E L A W CON-
C E R N I N G T H E U S E O F C I R C U M S T A N T I A L 
E V I D E N C E 
C. T H E I N S T R U C T I O N W A S A N IM-
P R O P E R COMMENT ON T H E E V I D E N C E , 
A S S U M E D FACTS, A N D C O N F U S E D A N D 
M I S L E D T H E J U R Y 
The jury retired initially at 4:34 p.m. (T. 206) 
and deliberated until 6:25 p.m. when they returned with 
some questions about the quality and quantity of the 
grand larceny evidence. (T. 217, 218). The foreman 
stated, "Our question is: What is evidence, considered 
evidence, in regard to missing items? That is, items 
that are reportedly missing but not recovered?" (T. 
218). At this point defense counsel requested a con-
ference at the bench which request it appears was not 
acted on. The court then asked if the jury had any 
other questions and the foreman expanded on the nature 
of the jury's problem stating, 
"I t has been stated that three saddles were re-
moved. Our question is, to what extent must the 
State prove, that is, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that these saddles were taken. In other words, 
would a statement by Intermountain the follow-
ing morning that these saddles were missing 
upon searching the premises, and can we assume 
then that that was part of the same affair the 
night before? Or must the State have some other 
way of proving that these saddles are involved?" 
( T . 218, 219). 
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To this question the court made the following reply: 
"This is circumstantial evidence. Nobody saw 
the saddles go out. And you may consider all of 
the evidence surrounding the event, that they 
were there the day before, and they weren't there 
the next morning, and the time involved and any 
people who might have been around, and deter-
mine from that whether they were taken and if 
so who took them. You may consider that as 
some evidence on the subject. Any other ques-
tions." (T. 219) (emphasis added). 
The jury returned for further deliberations at 6:32 
p.m. (R. 248). After the jury had retired again the 
court observed that jurors usually have two or three 
questions and noted, "I thought this one was rather 
simple, so I didn't bother to wait and send a written 
instruction on it." (T. 220). 
Counsel properly objected to the court's so deal-
ing with the jury. (T. 221). The jury returned at 
6:57 p.m. with guilty verdicts on all counts and against 
both defendants. (T. 222). 
The colloquy between the court and the jury set 
out above was fraught with errors, any one of which 
require a reversal of the convictions. The court's answer 
to the jury's question was an instruction. The court 
found it to be one, but so simple as not to require 
writing. The court is in error in believing that it can 
give an oral instruction. I t cannot. State v. Aikers, 
87 Utah 507, 51 P.2d 1052 (1935), Kunz v. Nelson, 
94 Utah 185, 76 P.2d 577 (1938). Instructions to 
Utah juries must be in writing unless counsel stipulate 
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to waive this requirement. Utah R. Civ. P . 51. This 
rules applies as well to instructions in criminal matters 
by virtue of the command of Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-1 
(5) (1953). 
This provision of the law obtains to require counsel 
and the court to take the time prior to instructing the 
jury to prepare the correct statement of law on the 
points reasonably raised by the evidence. I t contem-
plates that opposing counsel, in conjunction with the 
court, will draft clear, understandable, fair, necessary, 
and proper instructions—instructions that will not un-
duly emphasize the position or evidence of either side 
and will accurately and appropriately state the law with 
respect to the evidence offered. The requirement of 
written instructions is designed to obviate the giving of 
a prejudicial instruction which assumes facts and is an 
improper comment on the evidence as occurred in the 
instant case. So fundamental and so vital is the right 
to proper instructions that even a failure to object to 
the improper giving of the same will not impinge on 
the rights of defendants. This court can notice these 
errors absent an objection in the trial court as is stated 
in Rule 51 and as has been stated by this court. State 
V. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 (1937). Clearly 
then, the instruction phase of a trial demands and is 
afforded the utmost in protection against impropriety. 
I t is axiomatic that the trial court cannot and must not 
deprive a defendant of his right to written instructions. 
When the jury indicated their confusion, the court 
should have granted counsel's request to approach the 
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nch. This request was made no doubt out of a desire 
have an opportunity to draft a proper instruction to 
I the jury in its handling of this circumstantial evid-
ce. The court did not allow said conference. Rather, 
Ld in violation of the statute and rules requiring that 
ey be written, and absent a waiver of this require-
ent by counsel, the court instructed orally. I t is sub-
itted that this procedure is improper and requires a 
versal and would have been so, even had the instruc-
t s been substantially correct . . . which they clearly 
ere not. 
B. T H E I N S T R U C T I O N W A S AN INCOR-
E C T S T A T E M E N T OF T H E L A W CON-
E R N I N G T H E U S E O F C I R C U M S T A N T I A L 
V I D E N C E . 
This court has examined the characteristics of in-
ructions with respect to circumstantial evidence on a 
umber of occasions. See State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 
n P.2d 805 (1942), State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 
20 P.2d 285 (1941); State v. Judd, 74 Utah 398, 279 
. 953 (1929). I t has required that when evidence of 
circumstantial nature is presented to the jury it must 
i accompanied with an instruction telling the jury how 
) use the same. State v. Burch, 100 Utah 414, 115 
.2d 911 (1941). Basically, the instruction should in-
>rm the jury of the requirement that circumstantial 
ridence exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than 
le guilt of the defendant. State v. Hutchings, 30 Utah 
19, 84 P . 893 (1906). In Hutching<s the defendant 
as charged with the offense of stealing one hundred 
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sixteen chickens. There was evidence that the chickens 
were not in the chicken house and the door thereto was 
open. The chickens were not found. There was evid-
ence that a fire had consumed some buildings attached 
to the chicken house on the night of the alleged theft. 
Further, it was shown that the defendant was observed 
a few blocks from the site of the alleged larceny going 
toward and returning from the area of the chicken house 
at the time of the fire. The defendant was not ob-
served by these witnesses to have been in possession of 
the chickens and he denied taking them. The court 
observed that several reasonable hypotheses existed 
other than that of the defendant's guilt. Among them 
were that the chickens were consumed in the fire or 
merely ran off. The court further observed that the 
defendant could not have had one hundred sixteen 
chickens when seen by the witnesses or the witnesses 
would have noticed it. The court held that an acquittal 
was incumbent if the evidence could be so reconciled and 
reversed the conviction because the instruction given 
did not properly allow the jury the latitude to so con-
strue the circumstantial evidence. 
The defendant submits that had the jury been 
properly instructed in the instant case they may well 
have found some of the evidence to be inconsistent with 
his guilt and thereby acquitted him. The defendant 
stated that he was within the fenced area of Intermoun-
tain Farmers' Ass'n. because he was following the tracks 
which he found exiting from a car which he believed 
had collided with his car earlier in the morning. He did 
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lot have any saddles with him and it is conceivable that 
these certain persons whom the defendant was following 
rould have committed the burglary and larceny and 
made off with the saddles. On the other hand, it may 
be that the witness who testified about the saddles was 
not sufficiently sure of whether or not the saddles were 
in fact missing to convince the jury, had proper instruc-
tions on that point been given. 
The defendant submits that rather than giving the 
oral instruction which it gave, the court should have 
given—at the time the confusion became apparent—the 
following instruction from State v. Merritt, 67 Utah 
325, 247 P . 497 (1926). 
"The state must not only convince you beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the alleged facts and cir-
cumstances are true, but they must be such facts 
and circumstances as are incompatible, upon any 
reasonable hypothesis, with the innocence of the 
accused and incapable of explanation upon any 
reasonable hypothesis other than that of the guilt 
of the accused." 67 Utah at 338. 
Although words similar to these were given to the 
jury in instruction number 13 (R.272), the jury ap-
parently did not understand that this applied to circum-
stantial evidence and it is not clear from the instruction 
that it does. If the court intended the instruction so to 
apply, it gave an inconsistent, contradictory, and con-
fusing instruction in the giving of the oral one. When 
the instructions given are inconsistent or confusing, a 
reversal is warranted. State v. Thompson, 31 Utah 228, 
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87 P . 709 (1906). The questions by the jury foreman 
indicated sufficient uncertainty on the part of the jury 
to make mandatory the giving of the above instruction. 
Had such been given and the jury understood that the 
quality and the quantity of the evidence with which 
they were concerned — and were clearly unconvinced 
by — must be such as to exclude every reasonable hy-
pothesis other than guilt, they may have decided the 
point differently. The defendant urges this court re-
verse both convictions because of the improper oral in-
struction and because of these further observations 
about the same which make it objectionable. 
C. T H E I N S T R U C T I O N W A S A N IM-
P R O P E R COMMENT ON T H E E V I D E N C E , 
A S S U M E D FACTS, A N D C O N F U S E D A N D 
M I S L E D T H E J U R Y 
This court has interpreted Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
to guarantee that a jury be the sole judge of the cred-
ibility of witnesses and the facts and to prevent a court 
from commenting on the evidence. State v. Harris, 1 
Utah2d 182, 264 P.2d 284 (1953). Trial courts are 
also prohibited from making any remark which might 
indicate the court's attitude toward the quality or credi-
bility of the evidence or that might imply the court 
favors the claims or positions of either party. State v. 
Sanders, 27 Utah2d 354, 496 P.2d 270 (1972); State 
V. Gleason, 86 Utah 26, 40 P.2d 222 (1935). To do so 
intrudes upon that exclusive province of the jury, al-
though it is possible to make observations about the 
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tnesses without making comments on the evidence. 
ate v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414 (1939). 
The evil to be avoided by preventing a comment 
the evidence is the probability that the jury will 
consciously relinquish their fact finding function to 
3 court if they are aware of the court's opinion on a 
fen point. This court examined the problem in State 
Seymour, 49 Utah 285, 163 P . 789 (1917). In that 
se, the defendant had been convicted of obtaining 
mey by false pretenses. The State had alleged that 
e of the false representations was about on-going 
ctory construction. In one of its instructions with 
spect to that fact, the trial court said, "which he [the 
fendant] then and there stated was in the course of 
nstruction and the same was near its completion." 
I. at 293, 163 P . at 792 . In finding that to be an 
lproper comment on the evidence and reversible error, 
is court stated, 
"Courts, in charging jurors should be very care-
ful not to assume any material fact or facts. 
Jurors, who are laymen, are always eager to fol-
low the opinion or judgment of the court, and if 
the court assumes any material fact in the charge, 
the jurors are most likely to follow the assump-
tions of the court. Indeed, we must assume that 
such is the case unless the record clearly shows 
the contrary." 49 Utah at 293-294. 
'his court further reasoned that since there existed 
ridence from which the jury could have found the de-
mdant not guilty, the comment was prejudicial. In 
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telling the jury in the instant case that they could con-
sider the fact that the saddles "were there the day be-
fore and they weren't there the next morning" (T. 
219), the trial judge commented on the evidence there-
by committing the same error as did the trial judge in 
Seymour. Whether or not there were saddles on the 
premises on March 13, 1973 was a fact to be determined 
by the jury. Whether or not they weren't there on 
March 14, 1973 was likewise a fact to be determined 
by the jury. The court further erred in telling the 
jury in the next sentence that they could "consider 
that as some evidence on the subject" (T. 219). I t 
is not clear whether in telling the jury to "consider 
that" the court is referring to its preceding comments 
or the testimony given. But certainly the jury could 
reasonably have believed that his statement about the 
saddles could be considered as evidence. 
The mandate to refrain from commenting on the 
evidence predominates even when the defendant does 
not take the stand and the evidence is not otherwise 
controverted. State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 
177 (1931). In Green, the defendant did not take the 
stand or admit anything although there was in evidence 
his confession made prior to the trial. The trial court 
gave an instruction that assumed the fact that there 
had been a killing. Although other evidence would 
amply bear out this conclusion, this court held it to be 
an improper comment on the evidence stating, 
"In this jurisdiction the trial judge is not per-
mitted to comment on the evidence, much less 
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may he indicate to the jury that some material 
facts, not admitted at the trial, are established 
beyond controversy. I t is the sole and exclusive 
province of the jury to determine the facts in all 
criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by 
the state is weak or strong, is in conflict or is not 
controverted." 78 Utah at 589-590. (emphasis 
added). 
xi reversing the conviction in Green, this court cited 
md amplified State v. Seymour, supra. 
Not only should the trial court not assume facts 
>r comment on the evidence, but it should avoid any 
itatement that indicates to the jury what weight the 
evidence has. State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497, 94 P . 987 
(1908). In that case, an adultery prosecution, the court 
lad observed that a man should not be allowed to co-
labit with a woman, hold himself out to his neighbors 
is married, and otherwise make it appear that they 
were husband and wife and then because the State can-
lot produce a witness to the marriage or a marriage 
license, go "scot free". This court reversed the con-
viction saying that although the comments were not so 
intended, they were prejudicial as an expression of 
the court's opinion as to the weight of the evidence and 
therefore, improper. 
In State V. Harris, 1 Utah2d 182, 264 P.2d 284 
(1953), a situation very near that in the instant case 
was presented to this court. In Harris the defendant 
was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxi-
cants. A subsequent trial was had to determine whether 
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he had previously been convicted of the same offense. 
The State offered the court records of Layton City to 
show that the defendant had been so convicted. The 
jurors questioned the sufficiency of the court records 
to discharge the State's burden with respect to a prior 
conviction. In referring to the record of the prior con-
viction offered by the State a juror asked, "we can 
accept this as concrete evidence?" The judge replied: 
'You can. If you accept that, it becomes your 
duty to answer the verdict a certain way. If not, 
you answer the other way. If you think Mr. 
Pederson has perjured himself, answer it the 
other way'." 1 Utah2d at 184. 
This court reversed holding the foregoing remarks by 
the trial judge to be an improper comment citing the 
reasoning of Mr. Justice Elias Hansen in State v. 
Green. 
In the four cases briefed above, Seymour, Greene, 
Green, and Harris, this court has propounded this rule: 
A trial court must not comment on the evidence. In 
doing so it runs the risk of assuming facts, indicating 
its opinion as to the weight of the evidence, and giving 
contradictory or confusing instructions. This invades 
the province of the jury and causes prejudice to the 
defendant which the Supreme Court will have to rectify 
with a reversal. The message could not be any clearer. 
Lest the State maintain the defendant was not 
prejudiced by the trial court's comment about the 
saddles, the defendant submits the following observa-
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is. The jury was unsatisfied with the quality and 
quantity of the evidence with respect to the saddles 
stated by their foreman. 
" I think the reason why we are confused is, it is 
very easy to look at material things in front of 
you and then try to consider things that were 
never recovered and never offered in evidence, 
and because we weren't seeing them, we didnt 
feel we were given evidence. . . " (T. 219) (em-
phasis added) 
The jury deliberated only a mere 27 minutes after 
i court had given the instruction complained of. Dur-
j this period they held four separate votes, counted 
5 results, and executed four verdicts. Not much time 
is left for deliberation which makes inescapable this 
delusion: The court's comments decided the matter 
r them—told them the saddles had been taken and 
•ongly inferred that the defendants had done the tak-
y. As a consequence the defendant urges the reversal 
his conviction. 
CONCLUION 
The defendant Hansen has herein set out five dis-
ict areas wherein the trial court erred. Any one of 
ese errors standing alone required a reversal of his 
eviction. When the errors are considered together, 
>wever, the impact on the defendant's basic right to a 
ir trial is devastating. Our system guarantees to each 
: us a just hearing when we finally have our "day in 
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court." This was denied to the defendant Hansen in 
this case, and he humbly asks this court to afford him 
the protection of our Constitution and our laws by re-
versing the conviction below and directing the court to 
dismiss the grand larceny charge and grant him a new 
trial on the burglary. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J . F R A N K L I N A L L R E D 
Attorney for Appellant 
Milton E . Hansen 
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